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I.   INTRODUCTION
 For more than three decades, the prison population in the United 
States has steadily increased.1 “[F]or the first time [in American his-
tory], more than one in every 100 adults is now confined in an Ameri-
can jail or prison.”2 During the course of this rapid expansion, states 
and the federal government have come to rely increasingly on private 
prisons. In 2007, private detention facilities housed more than 7% of 
incarcerated adults in federal and state prisons.3 At least 35 states 
and the District of Columbia now have private prisons; federal offi-
cials are also turning to private facilities.4 The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons pays private providers to house approximately 11.5% of fed-
                                                                                                                               
? Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law. I am grateful to Jeffrie 
Murphy, Antony Duff, and Richard Dagger for their thoughtful comments, and to partici-
pants in the 2009 Markets and Responsibilities workshop at Oxford University. 
 1. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/ 
8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf [hereinafter PEW REPORT]. 
2. Id. at 3. “Between 1987 and 2007, the national prison population has nearly 
tripled” from 585,084 to 1,596,127. Id. at 5.  
3. Stephanie Chen, U.S. News: Larger Inmate Population Is Boon to Private Prisons, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2008, at A4. The United Kingdom has also experienced a burgeoning 
prison population and increased reliance on private prisons. See Robert Verkaik, Private 
Prisons “Performing Worse than State-Run Jails,” INDEP., June 29, 2009, at 6. In England 
and Wales, private prisons account for 11% of the prison population. Id.
 4. REASON FOUNDATION, ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT 2008, 106 (Leonard C. Gi-
lroy ed., 2008), http://reason.org/files/b15b25f6bb40427e193e799628a1ea1b.pdf [hereinafter 
REASON FOUND. REPORT]. 
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eral inmates,5 and at the end of 2007, Immigration and Customs En-
forcement housed about 38% of its detainees in privately managed 
facilities.6
 The primary impetus for the private prison boom that began in 
the 1980s was the belief that for-profit corporations, subject to the 
rigors of market competition, could deliver correctional services more 
efficiently than could the state. According to the private providers, 
cost savings come through lower payroll costs, consolidation of pris-
oner populations, and the placement of facilities in low-cost markets.7
Indeed, studies have found that private prisons may reduce the cost 
of housing inmates by as much as 15%; another study indicates that 
states may be able to save up to $15 million on their yearly correc-
tions budgets by using privately managed prisons to house at least 
some of their inmate population.8 During the present economic crisis, 
many states are poised to increase their reliance on private prisons. 
In Oklahoma, for example, where approximately one-quarter of the 
state’s inmates are already housed in private facilities, several legis-
lators proposed expanding contracts with private prison providers.9
Similar proposals are pending in California,10 Florida,11
and Arizona.12
 Despite this enthusiasm for privatization, the cost-saving claim 
remains controversial. Some researchers have observed that private 
prison contractors typically siphon off the least costly inmates—those 
                                                                                                                               
 5. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, BOP: WEEKLY POPULATION REPORT, available at
http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly_report.jsp (calculated May 6, 2010 based on a total of 
24,413 inmates in privately managed facilities and a total federal prison population of 211,402). 
 6. REASON FOUND REPORT, supra note 4, at 106. Immigration detainees are not 
“prisoners” in the legal sense, and their incarceration does not constitute punishment. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (2006) (defining “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in 
any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, 
or diversionary program”). Although many of the same practical concerns about privatiza-
tion, see infra Part II, apply in the context of immigration detention, the argument about 
the meaning of punishment does not. 
 7. Chen, supra note 3, at A4. 
 8. James F. Blumstein, Mark A. Cohen & Suman Seth, Do Government Agencies 
Respond to Market Pressures? Evidence from Private Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 446, 
466 (2008). 
 9. Julie Bisbee, Private Sector May Aid Oklahoma’s Prison Woes, NEWSOK.COM,
Feb. 2, 2009, http://newsok.com/private-sector-may-aid-prison-woes/article/3342526; Mi-
chael McNutt, House Fights Prospect of Terrorism Detainees, OKLAHOMAN, May 23, 2009, 
at 15A.  
 10. Steven Harmon, Schwarzenegger Hopes Budget Debacle Leads to Lasting Reform,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 2, 2009. 
 11. Steve Bousquet, Florida Legislature Gives OK to Ship Inmates Out of State, MIAMI 
HERALD, June 8, 2009. 
 12. Luige del Puerto, Arizona Senate Panel Passes FY10 Budget After 9-Hour Debate,
ARIZ. CAP. TIMES, May 22, 2009. In the United Kingdom, “[t]he Government is committed 
to building five more private prisons to accommodate the growing prison population, which 
is predicted to rise to 96,000 by 2014.” Verkaik, supra note 3. 
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who are healthier and less violent than the incarcerated population 
as a whole.13 More generally, simple cost comparisons that appear to 
favor private facilities are based on per diem rates that may not re-
flect the full cost of incarceration.14 Others contend that whatever 
cost savings private prisons achieve, they come at the expense of in-
mate well-being—that private prison operators save money by skimp-
ing on personnel training and staffing, offering only minimal educa-
tional programming and vocational training, and housing inmates in 
cramped and unsafe quarters. Moreover, the profit motive is thought 
to create perverse incentives to extend inmate sentences and promote 
criminal justice policies that yield more and longer prison sentences 
regardless of whether they are in the public interest. Finally, critics 
decry the delegation of governmental functions to private actors and 
the threat it poses to democratic accountability and the rule of law.15
 While these important policy considerations may be reason 
enough to worry about the proliferation of private prisons, I argue 
that an even more fundamental consideration concerns the nature 
and justification of punishment in a liberal democratic polity. Pu-
nishment under law is a profound exercise of state power the mean-
ing and justification of which depend on the social and political insti-
tutions that authorize it. In a liberal state—as in the United States—
punishment is inflicted for public wrongs in the name of the people. 
Although it may be justified with reference to a plurality of public 
values, it is a predominantly retributive practice that constitutes and 
expresses society’s moral condemnation of criminal conduct. Central 
to this conception of punishment is the relationship between punish-
er and punished, for it transforms otherwise socially objectionable 
conduct, such as the deprivation of liberty, into a just social practice. 
Punishment is thus meaningful not primarily as a means to an end; 
rather, punishment instantiates justice. The delegation of punish-
ment through prison privatization attenuates the meaning of pu-
nishment in a liberal state and undermines the institution of  
criminal justice. 
                                                                                                                               
 13. KEVIN PRANIS, PRIVATE CORR. INST. INC., COST-SAVING OR COST-SHIFTING: THE
FISCAL IMPACT OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION IN ARIZONA 3 (2004), available at
http://www.nicic.org/Library/020388 (“Prisoners housed in private facilities were far less 
likely to be convicted of serious or violent offenses, or to have high medical and mental 
health needs, than prisoners housed in public facilities used to generate cost compari-
sons.”); see also PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that medical care is one of the 
most expensive items in corrections budgets); JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DE-
CISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 158 (1989) (reporting on the tendency to send “the 
best in the bunch” to private facilities). 
 14. See Gerry Gaes, Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, 259 
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 32, 33-34 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/259/prison-privatization.htm. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
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 I begin by examining the phenomenon of privatization in the lib-
eral democratic context generally, considering a range of activities 
that, while publicly financed, are performed in whole or in part by 
private entities. This inquiry suggests a number of criteria for eva-
luating the wisdom of privatization in practical terms and the suita-
bility of privatization more generally. In view of these considerations, 
I outline some of the practical issues raised by prison privatization, 
ranging from the potentially distorting effects of the profit motive to 
the challenge of effective oversight of contractor discretion and the 
implications for due process and the rule of law. This analysis high-
lights serious concerns about the trend toward penal privatization 
that ultimately rest on a set of empirical claims about its tendency to 
yield undesirable social and political consequences. 
 The case that I construct against prison privatization is, by con-
trast, normative and conceptual. According to this approach, a judg-
ment about prison privatization depends not only on its potential to 
produce bad consequences but also on the meaning and justification 
of punishment itself. I undertake this analysis by first canvassing the 
traditional purposes of punishment, then developing a justificatory 
account that is predominantly retributive and broadly consonant 
with liberal-democratic values. This sets the stage for a discussion of 
the meaning of liberal-democratic punishment in the United States 
based on a conception of criminal justice as a type of moral dialogue 
between individuals and their community. With this view, the state 
is the legal embodiment of the political community, calling offenders 
to account for their wrongful conduct. Imprisonment, the primary 
mode of serious punishment in the United States, represents a grave 
form of censure that constitutes the normative community’s moral 
condemnation of serious wrongdoing. Filtered through the medium of 
privatization, this communication is necessarily garbled. In our rush 
to privatization, we risk compromising the meaning and value of our 
punitive institutions and practices. If and when the latest economic 
crisis passes, we may find that it is too late to recover them.  
II.   PRIVATIZATION
 As a general matter, privatization is “the use of the private sector 
in the provision of a good or service, the components of which include 
financing, operations (supplying, production, delivery), and quality 
control.”16 Private actors involved in the provision of public goods or 
services may include corporations, interest groups, and nonprofit or-
ganizations. Their level of involvement varies widely, ranging from 
consulting and standard-setting to financing, constructing, and oper-
                                                                                                                               
 16. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2006), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33777.pdf. 
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ating facilities designed to fulfill governmental responsibilities. For 
example, professional associations, such as the American Bar Associ-
ation, often develop and enforce professional standards in a variety of 
settings; religious organizations offer alternatives to welfare and 
public education funded through voucher programs or tax credits; 
and for-profit corporations supply catering, medical, and waste man-
agement services to governmental entities on a contract basis, as well 
as build and manage hospitals, prisons, and military facilities to 
meet public-sector demand. At the far reaches of public-private part-
nership are such quasi-governmental entities as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac,17 the United States Postal Service,18 and the American 
Red Cross.19 Although my current focus is primarily “contracting 
out”—agreements between governments and private providers to 
supply public goods and services20—I first briefly review the historical 
context out of which this particular form of privatization developed. 
A.   Context and Case for Privatization 
 As many commentators have observed, the traditional distinction 
between public and private realms is both powerfully intuitive and 
somewhat misleading.21 Historically, a number of what we have come 
to regard as public functions were performed through private initia-
tive, including police and fire protection, tax collection, and educa-
tion.22 In this setting, government relied on a variety of regulatory 
mechanisms, including tax policy and corporate law, to encourage 
private actors to pursue the public interest along with their own.23
With the expansion of the administrative state in the middle part of 
the twentieth century, people’s expectations of government, and thus 
the opportunity for contracting out, greatly increased.24 In the mod-
ern era, public-private partnerships are more likely to involve direct 
                                                                                                                               
 17. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises chartered by 
Congress. See Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited  Oct. 18, 2010); 
Freddie Mac, Frequently Asked Questions About Freddie Mac, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/faqs/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 18. The United States Postal service is a semi-independent federal agency. See Robert 
Longley, About the U.S. Postal Service: A Very “Business-like” Semi-governmental Agency, 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/consumerawareness/a/uspsabout.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 19. The American Red Cross operates under a congressionally issued corporate char-
ter. See American Red Cross, The Federal Charter of the American Red Cross, 
http://www.redcross.org/museum/history/charter.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 20. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 552-53 n.19 (2000). 
21. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229-30 (2003); Freeman, supra note 20, at 547. 
 22. See Freeman, supra note 20, at 552-53. 
 23. Minow, supra note 21, at 1237. 
24. See id. at 1240; DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 4-5. 
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financing, joint ventures, and market-style competition.25 Today, 
“[v]irtually any example of service provision or regulation reveals a 
deep interdependence among public and private actors in accomplish-
ing the business of governance.”26
 Despite this interdependence, the distinction between public and 
private remains meaningful insofar as “[p]rivate firms and public 
agencies tend to have different capacities, cultures, and priorities . . . 
and respond to different incentives.”27 Indeed, the fact that public 
and private providers may be animated by a different set of norms 
and goals gives rise to a range of concerns about the privatization of 
governmental responsibilities. Before turning to these issues, I will 
first briefly outline the case for privatization and identify the major 
grounds for criticism. Next, I will examine the phenomenon of prison 
privatization in particular, highlighting the specific challenges  
it presents.  
 The basic case for privatization, particularly contracting out, 
turns on the greater efficiencies available through the operation of 
market mechanisms. Because governments function more or less as 
monopolies, they lack adequate incentives to pursue cost-saving in-
novations. Through the power of competition, however, private firms 
are motivated to deliver goods and services more cost-effectively—
lest competitors underbid them—through streamlined management 
and operations. Whereas governments must contend with entrenched 
bureaucracies and public employee unions, private entities have the 
flexibility to hire, fire, and adjust staffing and wage levels to respond 
to prevailing market conditions. In addition, the availability of pri-
vate capital facilitates the timely design and implementation of  
new ventures. 
 Beyond the economic advantages associated with privatization, 
the competition it generates may lead to experimentation in the pro-
vision of social services and novel responses to persistent social prob-
lems.28 At least some proponents of privatization also view it as a 
means to reduce the size and power of government and thereby pro-
mote greater individual liberty and choice.29 The availability of 
vouchers or tax credits, for example, allows parents to choose educa-
tional options that reflect their values and traditions, while at the 
same time promoting pluralism and community.30 Such “[g]roup af-
                                                                                                                               
 25. Minow, supra note 21, at 1240-41. 
 26. Freeman, supra note 20, at 547.  
27. Id. at 550. 
 28. See Minow, supra note 21, at 1245. 
29. See id. at 1242-43. 
30. See id. at 1244-45. Minow endorses “nontoxic pluralism,” which requires that in-
dividuals be permitted “to exit and to participate in multiple groups or even none at all.” 
Id. at 1245. 
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filiations can encourage virtues of participation, self-governance, mu-
tual aid, and care for others, while allowing freedom from the control-
ling force of a powerful government.”31
B.   Potential Problems 
 Despite the considerable potential and expectations for privatiza-
tion in the United States, the results to date reveal a mixed record.32
Although one leading proponent of privatization contends that “the 
empirical question has long since been answered in its favor,” even 
he acknowledges that a number of practices have weakened the case 
for privatization and threaten its viability.33 In particular, he notes 
the troubling use of campaign contributions to influence the award-
ing of contracts, the lack of transparent decisionmaking processes, 
and the use of anticompetitive tactics by private providers.34 These 
concerns, and many others, highlight the challenges associated with 
privatization. In what follows, I take up these issues under four gen-
eral headings—market failure, public accountability, legitimacy, and 
nonpublic motives.35
 A “market failure,” as I use the term here, occurs when the ordi-
nary operation of market mechanisms cannot be counted on to yield 
optimal outcomes. Thus, for example, if a government contracts with 
a private firm for the provision of an essential service that requires 
significant initial capital expenditures and expertise, the government 
is in a poor position to negotiate—or deny—contract extensions if it 
has become dependent on the private provider’s service. In a variety 
of contexts, including prison construction and management, the firm 
may be able to raise rates dramatically over the initial contract bid 
because the government cannot forgo the service—say, housing dan-
gerous criminals—and lacks readily available alternatives. Addition-
ally, private firms face the risk of business failure. A corporation may 
mismanage its operation to the point of bankruptcy, leaving the gov-
ernment either to bail out the operation financially or scramble to 
identify alternative service providers, which may themselves extract 
a premium based on the government’s desperation for immediate 
supply. Other sources of market failure include the use of campaign 
contributions to influence the public officials who award government 
                                                                                                                               
31. Id.
 32. For a discussion of the mixed results of privatization in various contexts, see John 
J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1273-82 
(2003) and Minow, supra note 21, at 1248-49, n.68. 
 33. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Privatization, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON., LIBR. OF 
ECON. & LIBERTY, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Privatization.html (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2010). 
34. Id.
 35. As will become clear, these are not so much discrete categories as they are conve-
nient terms for overlapping clusters of value. 
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contracts36 and the inherent challenges of drafting suitable contracts 
that specify with adequate precision the terms and expectations of 
performance. In the absence of “solid and measurable performance 
standards,” it will be difficult to determine whether government is 
“getting the full measure of services it expects at the promised  
lower cost.”37
 The challenge of drafting sufficiently detailed contracts points to a 
further set of concerns relating to privatization—democratic accoun-
tability. Effective public oversight and control requires transparency 
in the contracting process as well as detailed public disclosure re-
garding contract terms and performance. Where the privatization 
process lacks mechanisms for specifying public goals and evaluating 
the quality of privately provided services, however, citizens cannot 
make informed judgments about the performance of the contract—or 
of their elected officials.38 As one commentator notes, “Self-
government will not retain meaning if major decisions about public 
resources and the shape of collective experiences occur without the 
knowledge or participation of the nation’s citizens.”39 Finally, to the 
extent that the delegation of government functions to private actors 
diminishes legal liability, it weakens a powerful mechanism for en-
suring accountability in the exercise of public power.40
 The delegation of public functions to private actors also gives rise 
to concerns about political legitimacy. In the liberal-democratic con-
text, legitimacy derives from the will of the people and the rule of 
law. Specifically, self-government entails a significant role for popu-
lar participation in the making and implementation of the rules and 
policies that bind us. In the context of privatization, however, the 
imprecision of drafting ensures that contracts will underspecify the 
terms and expectations of service, leaving extensive discretion to pri-
vate actors facing unanticipated contingencies. Under these circums-
tances, the quality and character of public services will depend on the 
ad hoc judgments of private actors, who may or may not be motivated 
by public concern. Although the exercise of contractor discretion in 
some contexts—say, garbage collection—is likely to be unproblemat-
ic, in other cases, individual citizens—welfare recipients, school 
                                                                                                                               
 36. Contracts awarded on the basis of aggressive lobbying, rather than the competi-
tiveness of the bid, are less likely to reflect prevailing market values. 
 37. Poole, supra note 33, at 4. 
 38. See Minow, supra note 21, at 1260. 
39. Id.
 40. The state action doctrine imposes constitutional obligations on private actors un-
der certain conditions. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619-20 
(1991); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-50 (1988). Despite its potential to hold private ac-
tors accountable for the exercise of public power, the applicability of the state action doc-
trine is quite narrow. Indeed, “[a]s a mechanism for disciplining private actors, the doc-
trine proves inept.” Freeman, supra note 20, at 579. 
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children, inmates—may be subject to arbitrary decisionmaking and 
denied the protection of the rule of law. In a political environment 
where even intergovernmental delegation raises concerns, delegation 
to private actors is even more worrisome. For “[p]rivate actors ex-
acerbate all of the concerns that make the exercise of [delegated] dis-
cretion so problematic.”41
 A final set of concerns stems from the nonpublic motivations cha-
racteristic of private actors. Although private firms and public enti-
ties alike rely on individual workers earning paychecks to carry out 
their activities, firms and their employees operate within the domain 
of competitive profit seeking.42 In this environment, “most private 
organizations may not develop the institutional norms of professio-
nalism and public service that characterize many public bureaucra-
cies.”43 To say this is not, of course, to denigrate the profit motive or 
to glorify public service; it is only to recognize that it is likely to gen-
erate a different set of workplace norms and values. In particular, 
because public employees are generally insulated from strict market 
discipline, their loyalty is to the government and its purposes; private 
employees’ incentives are likely to be more directly linked to their 
firm’s bottom line.44 Moreover, just “the appearance of private mo-
tives in a public domain can undermine respect for government and 
even generate doubt whether the government is sincerely pursuing  
public purposes.”45
C.   Private Prisons 
 The private prison boom of the 1980s marked the beginning of on-
ly the latest chapter in a long history of private sector involvement in 
public corrections in the United States. Before the advent of punitive 
incarceration in the late eighteenth century, jails were run by for-
profit providers paid by local governments to house debtors and sus-
pects awaiting trial or capital punishment.46 The move to a govern-
                                                                                                                               
 41. Freeman, supra note 20, at 574. As Freeman notes, private actors are “one step 
further removed from direct accountability to the electorate” and “remain relatively insu-
lated from the legislative, executive, and judicial oversight to which agencies must submit.” 
Id. For an argument that delegation of prison functions to private providers constitutes an 
unconstitutional delegation, see Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper 
Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 , 650-51 (1987). 
 42. To the extent that they are not motivated by profit, it is unclear how the market 
discipline that makes privatization appealing could yield the desired consequences. 
 43. Freeman, supra note 20, at 574. Freeman notes that private organizations may be 
motivated by ideology, group allegiance, or profit. Id. For convenience, I will refer to these 
collectively as nonpublic motives. Also, private prison contractors, unlike private schools 
and private rehabilitation providers, are almost exclusively for-profit corporations. 
 44. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 
518-19 (2005). 
 45. Minow, supra note 21, at 1234. 
 46. Dolovich, supra note 44, at 450. 
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ment-run penitentiary system around 1790 was based on the idea 
that a term of imprisonment might facilitate the reform of wrong-
doers, especially if they were occupied in productive labor.47 Before 
long, private firms began contracting with prisons for the use of in-
mate labor, transforming prison workshops into sites of industrial 
production.48 In this way, government was able to defray the cost of 
incarceration and perhaps turn a profit, while private industry 
gained access to cheap labor and greater profit margins. During the 
nineteenth century, a mix of leasing and contract arrangements pro-
liferated, sending inmates to work for mines, railroads, and construc-
tion contractors; in some cases, private contractors assumed respon-
sibility for all aspects of prison management in exchange for access to  
inmate labor.49
 The contemporary practice of contracting out to private corpora-
tions for total prison management is linked to significant public poli-
cy shifts in the 1970s. First, the rehabilitative ideal, which had dom-
inated penal practices during much of the twentieth century, fell out 
of favor when it produced disparate and indeterminate criminal sen-
tences while failing to reduce recidivism or deter crime. Soaring 
crime rates led to demands for tougher criminal justice policies to 
protect the public and provide criminal offenders their just deserts. 
At the same time, laissez-faire economics, characterized by faith in 
the productive capacity of private property, suspicion of public regu-
lation, and an aversion to “big government,” were on the rise in both 
the United Kingdom and the United States, championed by both 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In the United States, the 
resulting criminal justice policies included a dramatic expansion in 
the number and type of offenses carrying a term of imprisonment and 
the imposition of significantly longer prison sentences on serious of-
fenders. Facing burgeoning demand for prison beds, government 
turned to the private sector, which promised to supply comparable 
corrections services at greatly reduced costs.50
 Despite the ideological appeal, the primary impetus for the move 
to private prisons in the United States was and remains financial. As 
prison costs continued to rise throughout the last several decades, 
private corrections companies offered to house and manage inmates 
at substantially lower rates than the states were able to achieve 
themselves. In 2008, for example, California’s contract with GEO 
                                                                                                                               
 47. DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 26 
(1995). The move to public penitentiaries also reflected the developing Enlightenment view 
that criminal conduct constituted a transgression against the community. See, e.g., CESARE
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 36 (1872); see also infra Part IV. 
 48. SHICHOR, supra note 47, at 28-29. 
49. See id. at 34-35. 
 50. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 4-5. 
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Group, Inc. cost the state $60 per inmate per day, compared to $118 
per day—the average cost for the state to house inmates in its own 
facilities.51 Although savings rates in other jurisdictions are less 
dramatic—ranging from 2 to 15%—it still amounts to millions of dol-
lars in savings annually.52 According to the private providers, the key 
to private sector cost savings is cheaper private-sector labor. In Cali-
fornia, for example, state corrections officers, covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, earn up to $35 per hour, while GEO em-
ployees, who are not unionized, earn between $10 and $16 per hour.53
In addition, private operators can shift and consolidate geographical-
ly disparate prisoner populations, concentrating inmates in facilities 
located in areas with low real estate, wage, and construction costs. 
Finally, because private firms must compete against industry rivals, 
as well as government itself, they have the necessary incentives to 
develop innovative corrections strategies and streamline their opera-
tions in order to win and retain government contracts. 
 Unfortunately, this upbeat picture of the public-private compari-
son obscures more than it clarifies. As an initial matter, the studies 
(and contracts) that reflect dramatically reduced per diem rates in 
private facilities are misleading even on their own terms.54 Inmates 
with significant mental or physical health needs cost more to incarce-
rate than inmates without such problems. Similarly, both violent in-
mates and particularly vulnerable inmates require more restrictive—
and more expensive—security measures to ensure the safety of in-
mates and prison staff.55 Private contractors routinely decline to ac-
cept such inmates,56 an option unavailable to state-run facilities. 
Moreover, contract per diem rates typically do not include the costs of 
programming and medical services that governments must pay for 
                                                                                                                               
 51. Andy Furillo, Locking Up a Deal: Governor Seeks More for Private-Prison Firm,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 2008, at A1. In 2008, GEO Group sought an increase to a per 
diem rate of $60 per inmate, citing the need to raise the salaries of correctional officers. Id.
 52. See Gaes, supra note 14, at 33 (citing studies reflecting cost savings of between  
2 and 15%). 
 53. See Furillo, supra note 51. 
 54. One leading researcher points out the methodological complexities associated with 
cost comparisons. See Gaes, supra note 14, at 33. In particular, while some studies calcu-
late costs based on actual governmental outlays for public facilities, others estimate the 
costs that would have been incurred for comparable inmate populations. See id. at 34. 
These divergent approaches can yield dramatically different results. See id. For example, a 
pair of contemporaneous studies—one privately funded, one done by the Board of Prisons—
assessed the per diem costs of the same four facilities. See id. at 33. The industry study 
found cost savings of nearly 15%, while the BOP found savings of only 2%. Id.
55. See PEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
 56. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 158. 
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separately.57 More generally, the promised innovation and dramati-
cally lower recidivism rates never materialized.58
 Meanwhile, focusing on cost comparisons to the exclusion of other 
considerations means neglecting a range of important values at stake 
in the corrections context, implicitly accepting efficiency as the prime 
value of penal policy.59 In fact, several of the practical concerns raised 
by privatization generally—market failure, public accountability, 
democratic legitimacy, and nonpublic motives—apply with special 
force in the context of prison privatization.  
 The traditional market mechanisms for disciplining poor perfor-
mance may not operate effectively in the private prison setting. As an 
initial matter, the “beneficiaries” of the contract—inmates—are not 
the purchasers of prison services. Thus, unlike the market for private 
education, for example, where families can research alternatives, 
make informed selections, and withdraw from unsatisfactory ar-
rangements, inmates do not have a say in the decision whether to 
enter or terminate a private prison contract. Although the same is 
true when governments contract out for garbage collection—the bene-
ficiaries of the contract are not a party to the contract—dissatisfied 
citizens, unlike inmates, are in a strong political position to demand 
improved service. Inmates, by contrast, are virtually powerless to 
effect change in the face of unsatisfactory prison conditions. Most 
lack the basic right to vote; and in any case, they constitute an unpo-
pular minority without political influence or efficacy. 
 Even governments may not be well positioned to respond to non-
compliance by private prison contractors. Public officials dissatisfied 
with a contractor’s performance—or rate increases—cannot realisti-
cally cancel the contract before finding alternative placements for 
hundreds of inmates. The high start-up costs for prison operations 
ensure that a relatively small number of players will (and do) domi-
nate the market, giving them considerable leverage when negotiating 
with governments desperate to place inmates.60 Although a handful 
                                                                                                                               
 57. See, e.g., Bisbee, supra note 9 (noting that treatment and rehabilitation services 
are generally not included in contract prices).  
 58. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 162 (“[I]n general, incarcerating people is an en-
terprise with relatively little scope for resource-sparing technical progress.”); Dolovich, 
supra note 44, at 476 (noting the lack of evidence of cost-saving innovation in  
private-sector prisons). 
59. Cf. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
58 (1987) (characterizing as “price worship” the tendency to assign greater importance to 
quantitative over qualitative assessments of value). 
 60. DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 165 (noting the factors contributing to the small 
number of private corrections firms and the difficulty for states of attempting to switch 
companies); see also PRANIS, supra note 13, at 16 (describing the situation in Louisiana 
during the mid-1990s when the state was prevented from canceling a private prison con-
tract for noncompliance when it learned that doing so would adversely affect its  
bond rating).  
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of states have canceled contracts for noncompliance, they appear re-
luctant to rescind promptly even in cases of extreme inmate abuse.61
 A further source of concern arising from the private prison market 
is the role of lobbyists. Apart from the usual worries about the use of 
campaign contributions to curry favor with elected officials or the po-
tential for self-dealing, prison industry lobbyists may play an even 
more pernicious role—developing and promoting criminal justice pol-
icies solely to advance their financial interests. The most widely re-
ported example is the American Legislative Exchange Council, a 
Washington-based policy organization heavily funded by the two 
leading private prison firms, which successfully promoted such get-
tough sentencing laws as “three-strikes” and “truth in sentencing.”62
These and similar policies contributed substantially to increased de-
mand for private prison beds—and to the need for contracting out. 
Indeed, private firms, as rational actors subject to market pressures, 
have every incentive to pursue such a strategy. As one commentator 
cautions, “[w]e should . . . be wary that private-corrections corpora-
tions may initiate advertising campaigns to make the public feel 
more fearful of crime than it already is, in order to fill the prisons 
and jails.”63
 The challenges of contract drafting also create special problems in 
the private prison context. As many commentators have noted, the 
“incarceration function . . . proves difficult to specify.”64 As a result, 
contract terms are likely to be imprecise, providing an insufficient 
basis for gauging contractor performance. This problem is exacer-
bated in the prison setting, where the quality of performance—from 
the provision of medical care to the use of force—can mean the differ-
ence between life and death for inmates. Moreover, these activities 
take place behind closed doors in service of beneficiaries who lack 
meaningful recourse in cases of poor performance. In these circums-
tances, officials can be confident about neither the value of the con-
tract nor the well-being of inmates. These obstacles to public accoun-
tability suggest the challenges to effective oversight in precisely 
those circumstances that call for special vigilance. 
 A related set of issues is the threat to legitimacy resulting from 
inevitably vague contract terms. To the extent that the parameters 
for the use of force, inmate discipline, and administrative classifica-
                                                                                                                               
 61. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 44, at 498-99 (describing instances of inmate abuse 
and the time lag before contract cancellation). 
62. Id. at 526-27. 
 63. Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV.
813, 827-28 (1987). 
 64. Freeman, supra note 20, at 632; see also DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 166 (“At-
tempts to exhaustively spell out contingencies and assign rights and duties for each con-
ceivable case will be awkward and burdensome, and will almost surely fail to cover every-
thing.”). 
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tion are underspecified, private corrections employees exercise consi-
derable discretion on a daily basis. While these decisions can have a 
profound effect on the length and conditions of confinement, they re-
sult from “uncontracted-for contingencies” that cannot be settled in 
advance.65 Instead, private corrections employees—less well-paid, 
less well-trained, and less experienced than their public sector coun-
terparts66—will be left to make critical decisions, without reference to 
standards of due process or the rule of law.67
 Finally, the profit motive that fuels prison privatization exerts a 
constant pull in the direction of cost cutting. As various commenta-
tors have observed, contractors can attempt to save costs by reducing 
the amount spent on meeting inmates’ needs—food, housing, securi-
ty, medical care—and by keeping wages low.68 Because the delivery of 
these services is hidden from meaningful scrutiny, the temptation to 
cut corners is likely to be overwhelming.69 At the same time, private 
prisons offer substantially lower wages than public facilities and 
spend considerably less on training and retention.70 Predictably, they 
draw younger workers with less education and experience71 and have 
significantly higher turnover rates. In this environment, employees 
are less likely to develop the commitment to public values and shared 
norms of professionalism that contribute to rule compliance and
                                                                                                                               
 65. Dolovich, supra note 44, at 478-79. 
66. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 164 (presenting “suggestive evidence” to 
illustrate that private corrections employees are likely to be generally younger, less expe-
rienced and less well-educated); Furillo, supra note 51 (noting private corrections em-
ployees typically receive less training than their public sector counterparts). 
 67. Some critics note that these decision makers also have a financial interest in long-
er prison terms. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 44, at 518-19 (noting the “possibility that 
private prison operators, whose profitability depends on maintaining a high occupancy 
rate, could encourage their employees in subtle and not-so-subtle ways to make judgments 
regarding individual inmates’ behavior so as to prolong the amount of prison time that 
inmates serve”); Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private 
Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 141 (2001) (noting the 
potential for private prisons to “sustain their occupancy rates, and therefore their revenues 
. . . by manipulating inmates’ terms of incarceration”). 
68. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 170; Dolovich, supra note 44, at 474-75. 
 69. This is not to suggest that all—or any—private prison contractors are indifferent 
to public values or inmate well-being. As Donahue notes, most firms probably enter the 
industry with good intentions. But the structure of the enterprise—the quest for profits 
and the pressure of competition—create strong incentives to cut costs come what may. 
“And without robust measures to guarantee the conditions of confinement”—about which 
he is skeptical—“the businesspeople least constrained by scruples are likely to enjoy a 
competitive advantage in the imprisonment industry.” DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 170. 
 70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 71. DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 164. 
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promotion of the common good. As one observer lamented, “the pri-
vate sector is more interested in doing well than in doing good.”72
III.  JUSTIFYING PUNISHMENT
 Criminal punishment, in general terms, is the authorized imposi-
tion of deprivations—liberty, property, or other goods to which one 
has a right—or the imposition of special burdens because one has 
been found guilty of a criminal violation.73 In the absence of criminal 
wrongdoing, the sort of treatment that we call punishment—taking 
life, liberty, or property—would itself represent a grave injustice. For 
this reason, we must be able to provide a justification, or some com-
bination of justifications, that makes such otherwise prohibited 
treatment permissible or even obligatory. 
 The range of acceptable justifications—even the need for such a 
justification—depends on the social and political institutions that 
authorize criminal punishment. “Thus the color and texture of any 
possible justification for punishment will depend upon more general 
political and moral theory, consistent with the responsibilities for 
legal protection afforded by a just society.”74 In the Anglo-American 
tradition, legitimate punishment reflects such basic liberal-
democratic values as liberty, equality, and rule of law. Historically, 
the justification for punishment has shifted among the traditional 
accounts according to changes in the prevailing social and political 
norms. The ascendancy of the liberal commitment to autonomy and 
individual rights seems to have secured the place of such retributive 
values as culpability and desert, while discrediting utilitarian ap-
proaches to the extent that they lack side constraints that would con-
fine punishment to the blameworthy.75
A.   Traditional Justifications 
 The traditional scheme of classification divides the justifications 
for punishment in Anglo-American criminal law into two broad cate-
gories, utilitarian and retributive. Utilitarian76 justifications—
                                                                                                                               
 72. Robbins, supra note 63, at 816. 
73. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment. 
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 11-12 (1968); John 
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 3-4 (1955). 
 76. Utilitarianism is the most prominent form of consequentialism, the view that ac-
tions should be evaluated in terms of their consequences. For the utilitarian, the conse-
quence to be maximized is happiness—or utility. 
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principally incapacitation,77 deterrence,78 and rehabilitation79—are 
defended in terms of the positive consequences they are believed to 
bring about. In the case of deterrence, for example, its viability as a 
justification for punishment is measured in terms of its efficacy in 
achieving the goal of crime prevention by means of the threat of pu-
nishment. From the utilitarian perspective, punishment is justified in 
terms of its effectiveness in preventing crime while at the same time 
generating the least possible amount of human suffering. Proportional-
ity is thus defined in terms of the relevant utilitarian goals, prescrib-
ing exactly that amount of punishment necessary to achieve those 
goals; any suffering above that amount is excessive and unjustifiable.80
 Retributivism, by contrast, is centrally concerned with the imposi-
tion of punishment in proportion to an offender’s moral desert.81 On 
this view, punishment of the deserving is intrinsically good; its justi-
fication does not depend on any further positive consequences that 
punishment might be expected to produce. In Kant’s classic formula-
tion: “The law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative, 
and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a the-
ory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing 
the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it . . . .”82
Although a retributivist will welcome the positive consequences that 
punishment may incidentally yield—crime prevention or character 
reformation, for example—such consequences are not part of the jus-
                                                                                                                               
 77. Incapacitation involves disabling an offender from engaging in further criminal 
conduct. The most obvious forms of incapacitation are imprisonment and execution. In both 
cases, offenders are physically prevented from offending again. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, 
Panopticon Versus New South Wales, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 173, 183 (John 
Bowring ed., 1843) (“This contrivance [incapacitation] was as firmly laid in school-logic as 
could be wished. Mischievously or otherwise, for a body to act in a place, it must be there.”). 
 78. Deterrence may be either “general” or “specific.” General deterrence is the “pre-
vention of similar offences on the part of individuals at large, viz. by the repulsive influ-
ence exercised on the minds of bystanders by the apprehension of similar suffering in case 
of similar delinquency.” See id. at 174. Specific deterrence is “prevention of similar offences 
on the part of the particular individual punished in each instance, viz. by curing him of the 
will to do the like in future.” See id. at 174. 
 79. Rehabilitation involves the attempt to reform a wrongdoer, either in Bentham’s 
sense—by “curing” the offender of the impulse to engage in wrongdoing—or by otherwise 
reforming an “offender’s character, habits, or behavior patterns so as to diminish his crimi-
nal propensities.” ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 11 
n.? (1976). 
 80. See Bentham, supra note 77. 
81. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
105 (1997) [hereinafter MOORE, PLACING BLAME]. 
 82. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd 
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1965) (1797). 
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tification for punishment.83 Thus, a “retributivist punishes because, 
and only because, the offender deserves it.”84
 A further set of approaches to the justification of punishment—
expressive or communicative accounts—do not fit neatly into either 
the utilitarian or retributive categories, for they typically reflect ele-
ments of both.85 In general terms, they conceptualize punishment as 
a form of communication that expresses society’s moral condemna-
tion of criminal wrongdoing. In Joel Feinberg’s influential formula-
tion, “punishment is a conventional device for the expression of atti-
tudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval 
and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority him-
self or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”86 While 
Feinberg’s account highlights community condemnation as an “essen-
tial ingredient” in legal punishment,87 it suggests that some alterna-
tive mechanism could also serve as an appropriate vehicle for expres-
sion of this message.88 Feinberg’s expressivism thus has a decidedly 
utilitarian cast.89
 Contemporary communicative90 accounts are more explicitly retri-
butive, reflecting the prevailing orientation of Anglo-American crimi-
                                                                                                                               
83. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 374 (1981) (“These further con-
sequences are not to be dismissed simply; but we shall see them as an especially desirable 
and valuable bonus, not as part of a necessary condition for justly imposed punishment.”). 
 84. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABIL-
ITATION 94 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1995) [hereinafter Moore, Moral Worth]. Some concep-
tions of retributivism do not regard desert as the controlling value. See generally Jean 
Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & 
Jean Hampton, eds., 1988); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 
(1968) (defending a conception of retributive punishment based on the mutual assumption 
of benefits and burdens). Although these conceptions represent an important contribution 
to the literature, they do not reflect the prevailing view. See Bedau, supra note 73 (“But as 
the new century begins, no alternative approach shows any signs of supplementing the just 
deserts sentencing philosophy . . . .”). 
 85. For variations of the expressive theory, see R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICA-
TION, AND COMMUNITY 27 (2001) [hereinafter DUFF, PUNISHMENT]; JOEL FEINBERG, The 
Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY ch. 5 (1970); NOZICK, supra note 83, at 370-71; Hampton, supra note 84, at 
130. 
 86. FEINBERG, supra note 85, at 98. 
 87. Id. at 98, 105. 
88. Id. at 105 (concluding that a state might have other ways of expressing various 
messages, “but when it speaks by punishing, its message is loud and sure of getting 
across”). 
 89. Michael Moore has emphasized the distinction between utilitarian and retributive 
conceptions of punishment, designating traditional expressivist accounts utilitarian. See
Moore, Moral Worth, supra note 84, at 96; see also DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 85, at 
27, 206 n.29 (distinguishing retributivist from utilitarian versions of expressive purposes 
in punishment). 
 90. Following Antony Duff, I will use the term communicative to describe approaches 
that view punishment as a kind of dialogue between the community and some or all of its 
members. Although expressivist accounts also typically contemplate a recipient for the 
messages expressed, they do not require it. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 85, at 79; see 
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nal law.91 Indeed, “[p]unishment in its very conception is now ac-
knowledged to be an inherently retributive practice, whatever may be 
the further role of retribution as a (or the) justification or goal of pu-
nishment.”92 For communicative accounts this means, first, that pu-
nishment must be understood “not [as] a contingently efficient means 
towards a further and independently identifiable end . . . .”93 Rather, 
punishment itself constitutes the condemnatory communication; cen-
sure is internal to the practice.94 Second, the retributive orientation 
requires that “the relationship between past crime and present pu-
nishment [is] central to the meaning and justification of punishment 
. . . .”95 In these ways, the communicative account reflects the plural 
values that underlie Anglo-American criminal punishment, including 
its essentially retributive character.96
B.   Justifying Private Prisons 
 With the basic approaches to justification in hand, we can begin to 
see how they bear on the question of prison privatization. Before de-
veloping the retributive account of communicative punishment that I 
believe militates against prison privatization, I briefly sketch the re-
lationship between the traditional justifications in general terms and 
the suitability of prison privatization. This suggests that private 
prisons are most compatible with utilitarian approaches to punish-
ment, especially rehabilitation and incapacitation.97 Notably, the re-
habilitative ideal that took hold in the late eighteenth century facili-
tated the move to prison industrial operations involving the private 
sector. Similarly, the abandonment of that ideal, and the shift toward 
incapacitation, coincides with the rise of the modern private correc-
tions industry. At the same time, the retributive turn in penal phi-
                                                                                                                               
also Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages and Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 261-62 (2009). 
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (proposing revi-
sions to provision describing the purposes of the Model Penal Code to emphasize blame-
worthiness and retribution); Bedau, supra note 73. 
 92. Bedau, supra note 73. 
 93. R.A. Duff, Expression, Penance and Reform, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION,
supra note 84, at 169, 170 [hereinafter Duff, Expression].
 94. NOZICK, supra note 83, at 374 (“The wrongdoer has become disconnected from 
correct values, and the purpose of punishment is to (re)connect him. It is not that this con-
nection is a desired further effect of punishment: the act of retributive punishment itself 
effects this connection.”); Markel, supra note 90, at 260 (noting that “the good achieved by 
punishment is bound up in the faithful practice of retributive punishment itself, so that the 
practice of punishment has an intrinsic value that makes the practice and its limits both 
internally intelligible and attractive.”). 
 95. Duff, Expression, supra note 93, at 170; see also NOZICK, supra note 83, at 369; 
Markel, supra note 90, at 260. 
 96. See generally Bedau, supra note 73 (discussing the socio-legal development of im-
posing “just deserts” in sentencing). 
 97. Indeed, Bentham’s utilitarian conception of punishment was based on the idea of 
private contracting. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 171. 
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losophy may itself have been instrumental in the privatization boom, 
though based on a misapprehension of retributive values.  
 1.   Rehabilitation 
 Despite the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s, 
there was never a complete rejection of the idea that punishment 
might effect a change of heart, mind, or habit in criminal wrongdoers. 
To be sure, the most ambitious models of rehabilitation—from the 
Quaker vision of reforming souls to the psychiatric goal of curing the 
disease of crime—seem neither appealing nor realistic in contempo-
rary liberal terms. Whereas the eighteenth century penitentiary 
model presupposed a set of shared religious commitments that can 
neither be taken for granted nor coercively enforced in a liberal socie-
ty, the psychiatric conception of crime denies wrongdoers their status 
as responsible moral agents worthy of the rights that liberalism se-
cures.98 More modest rehabilitative goals, however, constrained by 
liberal-democratic principles, reflect our best understanding of the 
correlation between drug addiction, poverty, and mental illness on 
the one hand, and criminal misconduct on the other. Effective reha-
bilitation programs that target these correlates of crime are thus 
good for offenders, who are exposed to constructive options, and good 
for the society that experiences a reduction in crime. 
 The value of rehabilitative services, then, consists primarily in 
their effectiveness. The point is to provide programming—drug coun-
seling, vocational training, or therapeutic techniques—that yields 
positive consequences in the lives of offenders and their community. 
Rehabilitation is thus an instrumental good, valuable to the extent 
that it produces the desired results. 
 The case for privatization in the development and delivery of re-
habilitative services is easy to make out. A combination of religious 
organizations, other non-profits, and for-profit firms competing to 
provide rehabilitation services is likely to offer a range of cost-
effective alternatives. Whether governments adopt the programs of-
fered by a particular group or whether offenders are permitted to 
choose their own programs, the instrumental nature of the services 
provides the means to gauge their success. That is, we can determine 
the effectiveness of a drug program by assessing the rate at which it 
succeeds, relative to other approaches, in helping offenders end their 
drug dependency; vocational programs by their ability to impart the 
knowledge and skills for a trade or profession; and counseling servic-
es to the extent that they equip offenders to cope with the stresses 
                                                                                                                               
 98. Morris, supra note 84, at 487 (noting that “we display a lack of respect for the 
moral status of individuals, that is, a lack of respect for the reasoning and choices of indi-
viduals” if we treat acts of intentional wrongdoing as symptoms of disease). 
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and temptations of everyday life. Moreover, unlike the incarceration 
function itself, which provides little room for innovation or alterna-
tive philosophies,99 rehabilitative programming is ideally suited to 
creativity and experimentation.100 Finally, to the extent that priva-
tized rehabilitation services engage offenders in religious or other 
civic groups, they promote the values of pluralism and community.101
2.   “Retribution” and Incapacitation 
 When the psychiatric conception of rehabilitation gave way to re-
tribution and incapacitation as the dominant penal values in the 
1970s, the stage was set for the emergence of the private prison. But 
whereas the instrumentalist goal of incapacitation may be well suited 
to privatization,102 the retributive—or “just deserts” philosophy—is 
not. Unfortunately, the form of retribution that took root during this 
period was not always true to such fundamental retributive values as 
proportionality and humanity.103 Instead, perhaps as a reaction to the 
perceived laxity of the era that preceded it, the just deserts philoso-
phy too often amounted to nothing more than a get-tough approach to 
criminal justice, producing mandatory minimum sentences, repeat-
offender provisions, and generally longer prison terms across the 
board.104 Even more troubling was the cultivation of a social and po-
litical environment in which officials who expressed skepticism about 
these policies were branded “soft on crime” and turned out of office.105
 To the extent that retribution degenerates into a form of ven-
geance, indifferent to considerations of culpability and desert, it is 
compatible with penal privatization. Under these circumstances, pri-
vate prisons may have a role to play in delivering cost-effective pu-
nishment that provides a more or less humane environment for hous-
ing criminal offenders. But, absent a concern for proportionality and 
humanity, punishment ceases to be recognizably retributive. 
 Despite this bleak scenario, there is of course no necessary connec-
tion between various utilitarian justifications for punishment and the 
                                                                                                                               
 99. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 162-63; Dolovich, supra note 44, at 501. 
100. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 21, at 1236, 1245 (noting that privatization of prison-
er rehabilitation may promote pluralism, experimentation, and innovation).  
101. Id. at 1244. 
 102. That is, if incapacitation is the goal of punishment, then private prisons may be 
just as successful in disabling dangerous offenders as public facilities are. 
103. See KANT, supra note 82, at 101 (arguing for proportionality between crime and 
punishment); id. at 102 (insisting that punishment “must be kept entirely free of any mal-
treatment that would make an abomination of the humanity residing in the person suffer-
ing it”). 
 104. See generally MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 
IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004). 
 105. Id. at 15. 
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worst excesses of prison privatization.106 But by focusing on instru-
mental goals in evaluating prison privatization, we neglect the essen-
tially retributive character of our punitive institutions and practices. 
Fleshing out the meaning of punishment in the liberal-democratic 
context provides a firmer foundation for assessing private prisons. 
IV.   THE MEANING OF PUNISHMENT
 To flesh something out is to add detail to an existing structure—to 
put meat on the bones.107 Fleshing out the meaning of punishment, as 
I undertake it here, involves identifying the basic framework of liber-
al-democratic punishment in the Anglo-American tradition, then fill-
ing it out with some conceptual detail and defining its normative con-
tours. The resulting account of punishment will be recognizably our 
own, though it will not reflect the prevailing approach to punishment 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, or anywhere else. My aim 
is thus to suggest “an ideal conception of what punishment ought to 
be, in whose light we can evaluate (and no doubt find seriously want-
ing) our existing practices.”108
 I begin by outlining the familiar principles of the liberal-
democratic tradition that structure the institutions of criminal pu-
nishment, then draw on various retributive and communicative theo-
ries to sketch a conception of punishment that reflects the most com-
pelling features of that tradition.109 Finally, I consider the implica-
tions of the retributive-communicative account for prison privatiza-
tion, concluding that private prisons are largely inconsistent with the 
meaning of punishment in a liberal-democratic polity—that the proli-
feration of private prisons moves us further away from the highest 
ideals of the Anglo-American tradition. 
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A.   The Liberal-Democratic Political Tradition 
 The commitment to liberal-democracy sets the parameters for le-
gitimate punishment in the Anglo-American tradition. In its classic 
formulation, the liberal-democratic polity arises from a state of na-
ture into which individuals are born free and equal.110 Endowed with 
rationality and a bundle of natural rights, individuals come to recog-
nize the advantages of mutual cooperation and consent to form them-
selves into political communities that secure their rights and coordi-
nate their activities through the mechanisms of self-government and 
the rule of law. 
 One need not—should not—accept the state of nature as a histori-
cal phenomenon to appreciate the liberal-democratic values it show-
cases. In particular, because individuals are free and equal rights-
bearers, a status inherent in their humanity, they can neither be le-
gitimately deprived of their rights without their consent nor com-
pelled to sacrifice their own interests for the good of others. The 
commitment to self-government provides individuals a say in estab-
lishing and enforcing the laws that bind them, while the rule of law 
constrains arbitrary and unreasonable manifestations of collective 
power. Contemporary conceptions of liberalism introduce autonomy 
and pluralism that provide individuals the authority and resources for 
determining the course of their lives according to their own concep-
tions of meaning and value. Finally, part and parcel of Anglo-
American liberalism is a set of commitments—citizenship, community, 
and civic responsibility—traditionally denominated republican.111
 This distinctive blend of liberal and republican values yields a so-
cial and political environment that reflects neither extreme indivi-
dualism nor radical communitarianism, but a more or less stable bal-
ance between individual and community interests that is constantly 
being negotiated and renewed. At our worst, the obsession with indi-
vidual rights vitiates any sense of common purpose; at our best, polit-
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ical participation is deliberative, reshaping individual preferences in 
light of community norms and values. Indeed,  
[c]riminal law is . . . one area in which Americans have conceded to 
the state an almost unqualified right to act in the name of the poli-
ty, and hence one of the few places in which one can discern an 
American conception of political community that is not a mere col-
lage of individual preferences.112
 Nothing in this brief account of liberal-democratic values obvious-
ly disqualifies any of the traditional justifications for punishment. 
Utilitarian purposes—incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion—honor the basic liberal commitment to public order by securing 
the rights of individuals against criminal transgression. Retributiv-
ism respects the human capacity for choice that the commitment to 
individual rights presupposes. Yet the familiar weaknesses of these 
approaches quickly surface. Because utilitarianism conceives of the 
public good in the aggregate, it fails to take seriously the distinction 
between persons and is formally indifferent regarding the allocation 
of benefits and burdens.113 Absent side constraints, it countenances 
the deliberate infliction of punishment on the innocent114 and accom-
modates modes and methods of treatment that fail to accord with our 
basic sense of justice and proportionality. Moreover, because utilita-
rianism operates primarily through fear and manipulation rather 
than appeals to shared values, it fails to address individuals as citi-
zens or as members of a normative community.115
 For its part, retributivism, without more, seems less like a justifi-
cation for punishment than an article of faith. Despite the powerful 
intuitions that underwrite it, its historical and conceptual affinity 
with revenge should give us pause. The concept of desert at the heart 
of retributivism is similarly intuitive but also deeply mysterious, 
while the commitment to proportionality cannot provide or even sug-
gest a scale of deserved punishment.116
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172 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 38: 149 
 Although neither the utilitarian nor retributive justifications pro-
vide a complete, or completely satisfying, account of criminal pu-
nishment, only the retributive approach is ultimately consistent with 
the liberal-democratic values of the Anglo-American tradition. For 
retributive punishment is premised on the liberal individual with the 
distinctive set of attributes and capacities that determine our moral 
status. As free and rational agents, we are held accountable for our 
choices, including acts of criminal wrongdoing; to refrain from pu-
nishing for such acts would be to fail to treat wrongdoers as respon-
sible moral agents.117 Moreover, because our rights are inviolable and 
cannot be subordinated to the interests of others, the deliberate pu-
nishment of the innocent is ruled out of bounds regardless of whatev-
er social benefit it might produce. Finally, the social condemnation 
that inheres in retributive punishment presupposes a community of 
value as well as a responsible moral agent. In the absence of either, 
punishment lacks moral authority and retributive meaning. 
B.   Retributive Communication 
 In the modern liberal-democracy, acts of criminal wrongdoing are 
not only offenses against particular victims, but offenses against the 
community as well.118 While the most serious forms of law violation—
assault, robbery, and murder, for example—most dramatically affect 
direct and identifiable victims, law violation in all its forms consti-
tutes a transgression against the political community as a whole, a 
subversion of its norms and values. Because it is a liberal-democratic 
polity, moreover, its laws will reflect the self-determination of its 
members. For “[t]he voice of the law is (or aspires to be) the voice of 
the community addressing itself, the voice of all the citizens address-
ing one another and themselves.”119 Legal punishment represents the 
community’s formal response to criminal attacks, a “special social 
convention that signifies moral condemnation.”120
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 On the communicative conception, criminal justice represents a 
kind of “moral dialogue”121 between citizens and the state as the legal 
embodiment of the political community.122 “The distinctive meaning 
of criminal wrongdoing is its denial of some important value, such as 
the victim’s moral worth.”123 Against the backdrop of the community’s 
norms and conventions, the social meaning of criminal conduct is objec-
tive, conveying disrespect for victims and contempt for community val-
ues regardless of the offender’s subjective motive or intent.124 Likewise, 
criminal punishment draws its meaning from the values of the commu-
nity and its conventional forms of condemnatory expression. These re-
flect “deeply rooted public understandings” of particular modes of pu-
nishment that signify the gravity of criminal misconduct.125
C.   The Meaning of Prison 
 Punishment, then, is and effects a form of community censure that 
takes its meaning from the community’s values and conventions. The 
Anglo-American criminal law contemplates a wide array of punitive 
practices, ranging from fines to capital punishment, each with a more 
or less distinctive social meaning. Because “certain forms of hard 
treatment have become the conventional symbols of public reproba-
tion,”126 it is not enough to attend to the severity of punishment; we 
must also consider the mode of punishment as well. This accounts for 
why punishing a brutal rapist with a monetary fine would offend our 
sense of justice. The problem is not (only) that the punishment is too 
lenient, it is rather the wrong kind of punishment;127 it is insufficient-
ly expressive of public condemnation, “trivializ[ing] the seriousness of 
the offense and denigrat[ing] the worth of the . . . victim.”128
 In the Anglo-American tradition, “[i]t is . . . imprisonment in a pe-
nitentiary, which now renders a crime infamous.”129 Because it en-
tails the extreme curtailment of individual liberty and physical ex-
clusion from the political community, it expresses condemnation in 
the clearest possible terms. In the liberal-democratic context, the loss 
of freedom and community “is our society’s most potent symbol of 
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moral condemnation.”130 It signifies “that the offender has, by his 
crime, made the maintenance of normal community with him imposs-
ible . . . .”131
 At its best, a term of imprisonment represents an extreme form of 
censure that “dramatically and unequivocally” expresses social con-
demnation for acts and agents of serious wrongdoing.132 In the con-
ventional parlance of the Anglo-American criminal law, it addresses 
offenders as responsible moral agents whose wrongful choices pro-
voke the community’s punitive response. However, what is heard 
“depends not just on the content of what is said, but on the context in 
which it is said, and the accent in which it is spoken.”133 Effective 
communication thus depends on the identity of the speaker as well as 
the identity of the listener, lest “some offenders . . . hear its voice, not 
as the voice of a community to which they belong and are treated as 
belonging, but as the voice of an alien and oppressive power . . . .”134
It must be “us against us” rather than “us against them.”135
 But perhaps, one might argue, the moral dialogue ends at the 
moment of conviction and sentencing. At that point, the community 
has articulated its values through the legislative process, affirmed its 
commitments through the mechanisms of enforcement and prosecu-
tion, and communicated censure to the offender directly through the 
trial process by pronouncing guilt and imposing a fitting sentence. 
What, if anything, remains to be said? What possible significance 
could attach to the identity of the jailer?136
 The first problem with this way of putting things is that it mis-
places the burden of justification. The enterprise of criminal justice, 
according to the retributive-communicative account, is not a series of 
discrete processes that can be neatly distinguished and parceled out 
for delivery. Rather, criminal justice encompasses the full range of 
decisions and actions that define, enforce, and affirm the communi-
ty’s standards of criminal behavior through a process of ongoing di-
alogue. In light of this, we should expect the state, as the legal embo-
diment of the political community, to assume responsibility for all 
aspects of criminal justice—to take our part in the dialogue. Carving 
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out one or more of these activities for private delivery thus requires 
justification in terms of the relevant legal, moral, and political val-
ues. So instead of asking opponents of privatization why the enter-
prise of community censure extends beyond the moment of conviction 
and sentencing, we should ask proponents of privatization why they 
believe that is the critical moment when the dialogue ends. What is it 
about punishment, imprisonment in particular, that distinguishes it 
from the other aspects of criminal justice? Why is the identity of the 
jailer insignificant? 
 One way to make the case that it does not matter who owns and 
operates a prison—so long as inmates are treated fairly and humane-
ly—would be to draw a sharp distinction between the responsibilities 
of prison personnel and those of legislators, prosecutors, and judges. 
On this view, prison employees, whether public or private, are 
charged with implementing the decisions of various public officials—
housing inmates for more or less determinate periods of time while 
maintaining a generally humane environment calculated to protect 
inmates and respect their rights. As such, punishment is akin to a 
ministerial function, involving the execution of policies and decisions 
made elsewhere by others. Although legislators, prosecutors, and 
judges (or juries) exercise considerable discretion in reaching their 
judgments, prison personnel, on this conception, do not. Thus, a prison 
employee acts “in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of 
legal authority, without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion 
concerning the propriety of the act to be performed.”137
 This argument is unavailing because it is based on a misconcep-
tion of prison operations. Prison personnel, ranging from top admin-
istrators to line officers, in fact exercise considerable discretion in 
virtually every aspect of their work. Although legislative and judicial 
mandates set the parameters of fair and humane treatment, it is not 
possible to anticipate every situation that is likely to arise or to speci-
fy appropriate responses in advance.138 As a result, prison personnel 
are necessarily afforded substantial discretion to establish and im-
plement prison policy and to address the day-to-day contingencies 
that they encounter in the prison environment. For their part, ad-
ministrators must develop policies regarding the provision of medical 
care, standards for administrative classification, and the procedures 
for inmate discipline.139 Corrections officers who interact directly with 
inmates must not only implement these policies in a variety of set-
tings, they must also make on-the-spot judgments about inmates and 
their behavior—determining whether they require medical attention, 
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represent a danger to themselves or others, or merit disciplinary ac-
tion, administrative segregation, or even the use of force.140 Moreover, 
these decisions are not confined to the margins of the prison expe-
rience; they arise on a daily basis and will dramatically affect the 
length and character of a criminal sentence. 
 Since prison personnel exercise considerable discretion, their role 
is not relevantly distinguishable from other actors in the criminal 
justice process whose decisions we recognize as our own.141 By priva-
tizing punishment, however, we terminate the dialogue between of-
fenders and their community in just the same way as if we privatized 
prosecutors and criminal courts. “Although some historical traditions 
permitted prosecutions initiated by private parties, contemporary 
U.S. practice consolidates prosecutorial power in the government, 
with the symbolic message that the government stands in for the 
community and private victims.”142 Indeed, even proponents of prison 
privatization balk at the idea of privatizing criminal courts.143 Our 
reasons for rejecting privatization of these aspects of criminal justice 
should lead us to resist prison privatization as well. 
 Moreover, despite the conventional meaning of prison in the An-
glo-American tradition, the message of punishment it constitutes can 
easily be scrambled. Prison privatization interposes a filter between 
the community and the offenders whom it calls to account. In particu-
lar, by transforming the institutions of punishment into commodi-
ties—fungible objects of economic exchange—privatization alters the 
character of punishment, reducing the punitive enterprise to a ques-
tion of price point and logistics. It becomes a puzzle to be solved ra-
ther than a dialogue to be opened or renewed. For in the same way 
that “[t]he law and the courts speak and act in the name of the politi-
cal community,”144 our conventions establish that our prisons do so as 
well.145 “That message ought to be conveyed by the offended commu-
nity of law-abiding citizens, through its public agents, to the incarce-
rated individual.”146 As we distance ourselves from the condemnatory 
practice, however, we attenuate its message of censure, alienating 
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offenders and ourselves from the meaning and value that constitute 
the liberal-democratic community.147
 Skeptics of the “social meaning” argument against prison privati-
zation observe that the cultural context that confers meaning is by no 
means fixed. Indeed, perhaps “there are already some legislators, 
judges, administrators, and entrepreneurs”—we might add citizens 
and criminal offenders—“who actually and honestly do not believe 
that ‘private’ imprisonment is significantly different from ‘public’ im-
prisonment in cultural terms.”148 To the extent that this is the case, it 
suggests how far we have strayed from the normative path of liberal-
democratic meaning. In fact, we can recall or envision changes in 
meaning regarding a number of culturally significant phenomena, 
such as marriage, parenthood, and rape. But presumably it is not a 
matter of indifference to us what course these changes take—
whether rape is or is not regarded as a serious violation of the self, 
whether marriage and family are limited to heterosexual couples or 
extended to homosexuals, polygamists, or other nontraditional ar-
rangements. In each instance, the challenge is to make a case for 
meaning in terms of our liberal-democratic values and to promote or 
resist cultural change on that basis. 
 In the case of criminal punishment, the contemporary focus on 
incapacitation, combined with an “us versus them” mentality toward 
criminal offenders, represents an impoverished conception of the lib-
eral-democratic community and charts a course in the wrong direc-
tion. It fails to take seriously both the capacity of persons to make 
and remake themselves and the number and variety of obstacles, af-
fecting some more than others, in the way of making socially respon-
sible choices. By contrast, the communicative conception of punish-
ment is predicated on precisely those features of the human condi-
tion—on our potential and our limitations—that ground our liberal-
democratic commitments. There is thus nothing “mysterious” about 
the idea that it matters who inflicts punishment.149 For punishment 
engages fellow citizens in one of the most serious and definitive en-
terprises of a liberal-democratic community—holding ourselves and 
one another responsible for our actions—and the voice of the commu-
nity is clearest when it speaks for itself. 
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V.   CONCLUSION
 The case against private prisons may be overdetermined. In the 
prevailing liberal-democratic context, their mixed record of perfor-
mance, along with the seemingly intractable practical problems they 
present, casts serious doubt on the value of private prisons. But the 
budgetary realities that hit home during the present economic crisis 
heighten the appeal of prison privatization. The burgeoning prison 
population in the United States, resulting from a variety of dubious 
criminal justice policies, does not seem likely to decrease any time 
soon. In this environment, private prisons may act as a kind of es-
cape valve that relieves the pressure we might otherwise feel to criti-
cally examine our policies and practices. 
 According to at least one commentator, however, advancing the 
claim that the management and operation of prisons is an inherently 
public function means implicitly accepting public prisons in their 
current form as the baseline for evaluating the private alternative.150
In this way, one risks being “coldhearted and blind” about the fate of 
actual inmates consigned to the deplorable conditions that prevail in 
our public prisons and jails.151 This sort of complacency would indeed 
suggest a kind of moral obtuseness that we are right to be on our 
guard against. My own hope is that by focusing on the meaning of 
punishment in the Anglo-American tradition, it may be possible to 
put our practices into fresh perspective, forcing us to confront the 
chain of events—the criminal justice policies, the millions impri-
soned, the overcrowded and indecent conditions—that led us astray. 
Punishment, especially imprisonment, is a serious matter, and we 
almost certainly punish too much—not in the utilitarian sense, but in 
terms of what our values are and what wrongdoers deserve. They de-
serve to be taken seriously as moral agents in the way that retribu-
tive punishment entails, and they deserve the full force of our cen-
sure when their choices flout the values that constitute the liberal-
democratic community of which we take them to be a part.
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